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THE PURSUIT OF PROCEEDS BY PLANS,
PARTICIPANTS AND PLAINTIFFS'
LAWYERS: DISSONANT SOLUTIONS
TO AN ALLITERATIVE PROBLEM
JOHN R. CELLA, JR.
I.

INTRODUCTION

An injured person's settlement with a tortfeasor becomes
more complicated when that person is a participant' or beneficiary2 of an employee welfare benefit plan 3 ("plan"). After settling
with the tortfeasor, the injured participant typically invokes state
law to prevent enforcement of plan provisions requiring reimbursement for payments from the plan to providers. Because the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 ("ERISA")
governs such plans, the settlement process compels scrutiny of
plan provisions addressing rights of subrogation and reimbursement out of settlement proceeds. When plans conflict with subrogation laws, wrongful death statutes, make-whole doctrines, and
attorney fee arrangements, the battles begin. Plans, participants,
and plaintiffs' lawyers compete for settlement proceeds, and such
competition entails a fascinating examination of ERISA. Courts
interpreting plan provisions and considering the sources and
amounts of settlements have reached disparate results in their
determination of which competitors prevail. As settlement proceeds decrease, the determination of the winners becomes more
1. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)(1994) (defining "participant" as "any employee or
former employee of an employer ... who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit . .. from an employee benefit plan . . . or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit").
2. See id. § 1002(8) (defining "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become
entitled to a benefit thereunder"). Participants often name spouses and
dependents as beneficiaries under employee benefit plans.
3. See id. § 1002(1) (defining "employee welfare benefit plan" as "any plan...
established or maintained by an employer ... for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment. .. ").
4. See id. §§ 1001 - 1461 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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difficult, and courts must exercise their equitable powers or defer
to the parties' existing bargain as revealed in the plan.
With emphasis on developments in the Fourth Circuit, this
Article first describes the pursuit's origination in plan language
and ERISA's statutory provisions; it then explores ERISA preemption and cases in which injured participants invoke state statutory and common law to contradict plan terms. A review of the
attorney's role follows, including an inquiry into issues concerning
attorney fees. With consideration of policies behind ERISA, the
Article concludes that adherence to well-drafted plan terms legitimizes the parties' bargain, avoids development of disparate federal common law, and facilitates the allocation of proceeds.
II. How THE

PURSUIT BEGINS

The debate over distribution of settlement proceeds is contentious. 5 The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United McGill Corporation v. Stinnett6 illustrates the problems posed in the pursuit
of settlement proceeds. In United McGill, a plan participant
incurred medical expenses of $39,000 after an accident. 7 After the
participant settled her claim with the tortfeasor for $100,000, the
plan, which had covered $31,418.89 of the medical expenses, sued
for full reimbursement pursuant to plan terms." At the district
court, the participant acknowledged the requirement to reimburse
the plan, but argued for a one-third reduction in the reimbursement amount so that the plan could "share in the cost of obtaining
the settlement."9 Accepting participant's argument, the district
court considered its approval of the pro rata reduction the "fair,
5. See generally Ellen E. Schultz, Health Plans Put the Bite on Some Cash
Settlements, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1994, at C1 (discussing the increase in
litigation involving employer health plans' enforcement of subrogation clauses
against participants' tort recoveries).
6. 154 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1998).
7. Id. at 170.
8. Id. The plan included provisions for reimbursement of medical expenses
and subrogation of rights. See id. The reimbursement provision entitled the
plan to a refund of the lesser of the amount recovered or the amount of benefits
paid, and the subrogation provision granted a right of subrogation "to the extent
of any benefits paid or payable under this plan." Id.
9. United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 950 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D. Md. 1996)
(allowing participant to reduce reimbursement to plan by one-third for attorney
fees incurred to secure settlement because absent participant's engagement of
attorney, the plan would not have received any reimbursement).
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appropriate, and equitable determination under the circumstances of [the] case." 10
Noting the district court's failure to discuss relevant plan provisions and its neglect of "well-settled principles of ERISA law,"
the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and
ordered the participant to reimburse the plan in full." The court
examined the plan language and concluded that "[aipplying federal common law to override the Plan's reimbursement provision
would contravene, rather than effectuate, the underlying purposes
2
of ERISA."1
Given the plan's clear language and the adequacy of settlement proceeds for satisfaction of the plan's lien and attorney fees,
the issues in United McGill were manageable. 1 3 Even so, courts'
treatment of situations in which the claims of plans and plaintiffs'
lawyers exceed settlement proceeds is unclear.' 4 If a plan's reimbursement and subrogation provisions fail to address attorney
fees, regardless of the plan's participation in the suit against the
tortfeasor, to what extent should courts resort to federal common
law for allocation of settlement proceeds? Moreover, at what point
do state statutes and common law survive ERISA preemption? An
examination of state law challenges to plan provisions reveals
that unambiguous, thorough plan terms, addressing a handful of
potential settlement outcomes, suffice to fortify ERISA preemption of state law and check development of disparate federal common law.
III.

RIGHTS OF SUBROGATION OR REIMBURSEMENT?

Clarification of the terms "subrogation" and "reimbursement"
must precede discussion of participants' legal challenges to plan
10. Id. at 137.
11. United McGill, 154 F.3d at 171.
12. Id. at 173.
13. The court pointed out that the participant could not "escape the
unambiguous language that obligate[d] her to repay the benefits paid in full
without mention of a pro rata deduction for her expenses." Id. According to the
plan administrator, the participant's retention of "approximately $67,000 [was]
more than enough to reimburse the Plan $31,418.89 for medical benefits
payments received from the Plan." Id. at 171.
14. Id. at 173. In a footnote, the court declined to address the hypothetical
situation in which a plan's reimbursement claim exceeds the remaining recovery
amount after deduction of attorney fees. See id. The court indicated, however,
that "future disputes over such an anomalous result can easily be avoided by
more careful drafting of subrogation and reimbursement provisions." Id.
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administrators' enforcement of plan provisions.1 5 These distinct
terms typically appear after plans' customary exclusions of coverage for medical expenses incurred as a result of some third party's
tortious act. 16 In a recent case involving a health plan outside
ERISA's governance, the South Carolina Court of Appeals defined
subrogation as
the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right. The general rule is that when an
insurer pays its insured for a loss resulting from the tortious conduct of a third party, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of its
insured against the third party. Subrogation enables the insurer
to recover the amount paid to its insured out of any judgment or
settlement proceeds received by the insured from the third party.
Subrogation can arise by statute, by contract, or through equity.
15. See Cagle v. Ford, 59 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (noting that
use of "subrogation" and "reimbursement" interchangeably is improper). The
court concluded that the written plan documents were clear, yet it cautioned "the
Fund, and other ERISA-regulated plans, to draft their plans and agreements
more carefully in the future." Id. at 556 n.3.
16. See, e.g., North Carolina Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Sturgill, No. 96-1270, 1997
WL 722776, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1997) (quoting summary plan description
which stated that "[medical care and disability benefits are not payable to or for
a person covered under this plan when the injury or illness to the covered person
occurs through the act or omission of another person"); Layne v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., No. 94-1549, 1994 WL 719673, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 1994)
(quoting summary plan description which excluded coverage for "[tireatment of
any illness, disease, or injury that is, or is expected to become, the subject of a
civil suit."); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 986 (4th
Cir. 1990) (quoting self-funded plan which stated that "[m]edical... benefits are
not payable to or for a person covered under the [plan] when the injury or illness
to the covered person occurs through the act or omission of another person.");
Health & Welfare Plan for Employees of S. Md. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Eagleston (In
re Eagleston), 236 B.R. 183, 189 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999) (quoting plan provision
that relieves plan from obligation "to make payments on claims arising from...
injuries to the extent that they... may be paid by a third party" who causes "an
[i]llness, a sickness, or a bodily injury"); Cagle, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (quoting
plan provision that gives plan right to seek repayment if benefits paid from plan
for "[ilnjuries caused by someone else"); Devine v. American Benefit Corp., 27 F.
Supp. 2d 669, 672 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (quoting plan provision excluding coverage
for "expenses incurred in connection with .

.

. [any illness or injury or other

condition for which any person, corporation, organization or other entity may be
liable or legally responsible by reason of negligence, an intentional act or breach
of any legal obligation"); McInnis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 853 F.
Supp. 880, 882 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (quoting plan provision that triggers
reimbursement and lien rights "when [participant or beneficiary] is injured
through the act or injury of another person").
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss2/2
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Conventional subrogation arises by contract and is specifically
7
bargained for by the parties.'
Accordingly, subrogation entails the "insurer stepping into
the shoes of the insured and attempting to recover from the third
party who caused the injury." i8 The Virginia Supreme Court also
has noted that "substitution as to both the rights and remedies is
a crucial characteristic of subrogation." 19
Therefore, in the employee welfare benefit plan context, a provision that grants the plan its participants' rights to sue
tortfeasors is appropriately characterized as a subrogation provision.2 0 For example, one summary plan description states that
"[t]o the extent that benefits are paid under this plan, the plan
shall be subrogated and succeed to any right of recovery of the participant or beneficiary for benefits paid against any
[tortfeasorl ... "1 These provisions also include language requiring participants' cooperation with the plan in the event of a suit.2 2
A simple interpretation of these subrogation provisions would lead
17. Shumpert v. Time Ins. Co., 496 S.E.2d 653, 656 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(citations omitted).
18. Waller, 906 F.2d at 989-990 n.7 (4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). The
court stated that the plan administrator was simply "seek[ing] ... the money it
paid out to the insured; it [was not seeking] to step into [the participant's] shoes
and proceed against the third party tortfeasor." Id.
19. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Smith, 241 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Va. 1978) (emphasis
added) (defining subrogation as the "substitution of one person in the place of
another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right ... so that he who is
substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim,
and its rights, remedies, or securities") (citation omitted).
20. Cagle, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (pointing out that "subrogation in effect
assigns (or requires assignment of) the tort claim to the subrogee (the plan)")
(quoting Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 950 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D. Minn. 1996)).
21. West Virginia-Ohio Valley Area I.B.E.W. Welfare Fund v. The American
Tobacco Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 733, 734 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 734-35 (requiring participant to "furnish such information, execute
such documents, and take such other action as may be necessary to enforce the
rights of the plan to recover any payments made"). See also Devine v. American
Benefit Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 669, 671 (citing plan provision that requires
participant or beneficiary "to provide information with respect to other persons,
corporations, organization[s], or other entities which may be liable for expenses
paid by the Plan"); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Cooke, No. 4:97-CV30-H3, 1998 WL 181260, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 1998) (ordering participants to
pay plan's attorney fees for bad faith violation of plan provision requiring
participant or participant's attorney to "notify [the plan] before filing any suit or
settling any claim so [the plan] may take part in the suit or settlement to protect
and enforce [the plan's] rights").
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2000
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one to believe that plans 'step into the injured participant's shoes'
and sue tortfeasors directly, but case law indicates that plans typically invoke reimbursement provisions after participants recover
from tortfeasors. 2 3 Depending on the plan, reimbursement provisions constitute a distinct set of rights, 24 combine with subrogation provisions, 25 or fall within the comprehensive umbrella of
plan subrogation rights.26
Plans' express rights to reimbursement allow for recovery of
benefits advanced on behalf of participants and beneficiaries for
treatment of injuries caused by some third party.2 7 These reimbursement provisions give plans rights to tap any or all settlement
proceeds obtained from the tortfeasor,28 prevent reductions in the
reimbursement amount for the participant's attorney fees, 29 and
23. See, e.g., Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Sparrow, 981 F.2d 726, 728 (4th Cir.
1992) (stating that employer with self-funded plan sought reimbursement of
medical expenses from beneficiary and attorney who had settled claim with
tortfeasor); Cagle, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (recognizing that plaintiffs typically
"'assert claims against tortfeasors which are ostensibly subrogated elsewhere,
and fight over allocation afterwards.'") (quoting Waller, 950 F. Supp. at 944).
24. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Barnhart, 19 F. Supp. 2d
584, 587 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) (citing plan provision granting plan assignee "a first
lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement, judgment, mediation or
arbitration, that the covered person receives from [a third party, its insurer or
guarantor, or the covered person's uninsured and/or underinsured motorist
insurance].").
25. See, e.g., Layne, 1994 WL 719673, at *1 n.1 (citing "official Plan
document" with heading "Subrogation and Right of Reimbursement").
26. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Cooke, 3 F. Supp. 2d
668, 670 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (quoting relevant plan terms, including the "Right of
Reimbursement," set forth "under the heading 'SUBROGATION").
27. Cagle, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 553-54 ("Reimbursement simply requires the
successful owner of the tort claim (the beneficiary) to repay the plan's advances")
(quoting Waller, 950 F. Supp. at 944).
28. See In re Paris, 44 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (D. Md. 1999) (quoting plan
provision that required, upon resolution of third party's liability, reimbursement
of union fund "up to the full amount of the recovery for the full amount of loss of
time benefits and/or medical benefits received" (emphasis added)); Rhodes, Inc. v.
Morrow, 937 F. Supp. 1202, 1210-11 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (citing plan provision
conditioning receipt of benefits on agreement to repay plan with recovery from
third party; plan stated that "[r]ecovery includes any amount received, whether
by judgment, settlement or otherwise" (emphasis added)).
29. See Paris, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (quoting signed subrogation agreement
with statement that union fund "'shall not be responsible for any of the
Claimant's attorneys' fees or the costs of the Claimant's litigation'"); Great-West,
19 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (quoting plan's statement that "first lien rights will not be
reduced .

.

. due to attorney's fees and costs"). But cf Liberty Corp. v. NCNB
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even recover amounts from non-tortfeasors, such as the injured
30
participant's uninsured and underinsured motorist carriers.
Because an injured participant's settlement with a tortfeasor
could occur without the plan's knowledge, and therefore render
any subrogation rights ineffective, 3 1 carefully drafted reimbursement provisions safeguard the plan's potential for recovery from
all possible sources.3 2 The Seventh Circuit has observed that:
Nat Bank of South Carolina, 984 F.2d 1383, 1385 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
plan reimbursement provision that permitted deduction of "reasonable pro-rata
expenses, such as lawyer's fees and court costs, incurred in effecting the third
party payment"); Rhodes, 937 F. Supp. at 1211 (quoting plan provision that
prohibited payment to the plan in an amount exceeding the "proceeds of any such
recovery after deducting reasonable and necessary expenditures in effecting such
recovery, including attorney's fees"). The fact that the plans in Liberty and
Rhodes allowed for reductions in the reimbursement amount to cover reasonable
attorney fees illustrates the significance of written, bargained-for plan terms
that contemplate the allocation of proceeds.
30. See Great-West, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (quoting plan that expressly
provided for reimbursement from "payment which the covered person is entitled
to receive from... uninsured and/or underinsured motorist insurance"); Cooke, 3
F. Supp. 2d at 670 (quoting plan's requirement that participant "pay [the plan]
the first dollars [the participant] recover[s] from any source ....

[including the

participant's] own insurance company"); Harmond v. Teamsters Joint Council
No. 83 of Virginia Health & Welfare Fund, 795 F. Supp. 783, 788-89 (E.D. Va.
1992) (adopting magistrate's opinion that trustees' interpretation that provision
subrogating plan to participant's rights "against any person, firm, corporation, or
other entity" included entitlement to participant's uninsured motorist coverage
was reasonable). Compare Harmond, 795 F. Supp. at 788 with Eagleston, 236
B.R. at 191-92 (rejecting plan's argument that language providing for recovery of
"any payment for... benefits ... receive[d] from [a] third party" encompassed
payments from participant's uninsured motorist policy; court ruled that "third
party" limited to tortfeasor). Note the range of specificity in the quoted plan
provisions. Arguably, the Great-West plan language is most resilient.
31. In Devine, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 675, the court pointed out that the plan's
coverage exclusion concerning injuries resulting from tortious acts of a third
party, effective only when such party "makes restitution for expenses incurred,"
was "obviously designed to prevent two asset-draining evils." Id. The court
expounded:
First, the provision prevents a participant from defeating the
subrogation right by settling first with a third-party tortfeasor and then
making a claim for benefits. Second, it prevents a participant's double
recovery, i.e., recovering benefits first, settling with the tortfeasor and
pocketing the windfall. The "exclusion" is a simple means for helping a
participant injured at the hands of a recalcitrant or judgment-proof
tortfeasor.
32. Schultz, supra note 5, at C1 (quoting health plan's lawyer, who
emphasized that "reimbursement provisions are intended to eliminate windfall
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2000
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reimbursement is a contractual right

governed by ERISA and comes into play only after a plan member
has received personal injury compensation. While subrogation
and reimbursement
may have similar effects, they are distinct
33
doctrines.
Interestingly, ERISA does not require summary plan descriptions to include language describing a plan's rights to subrogation
and reimbursement, though such language arguably facilitates
participants' and beneficiaries' understanding of their responsibilities under a plan.3 a Even though ERISA does not mandate such
language, a clear explanation of the plan's subrogation and reimbursement rights in the summary plan description undoubtedly
enhances the plan's legal position in any dispute over such
provisions.35
IV.

PRE-PURSUIT PERUSAL OF THE PLAN (AND

ERISA)

The pursuit of settlement proceeds requires careful review of
the plan itself and ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. Such
review is necessary to determine the proper initiator of an action,
the statutory grounds for such action, and the appropriate relief
sought.
To determine who can sue and be sued, the plan and ERISA's
"'carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions'" 36 must be
read together. The plan, which reveals the responsibilities and
functions of persons and entities, facilitates classification of parties under ERISA's statutory definitions 37 and civil enforcement
double recoveries . . . [and] keep the cost of coverage and medical care down for
everyone").
33. Unisys Medical Plan v. Timm, 98 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1996).
34. Rhodes, 937 F. Supp. at 1209. The court noted that ERISA does not
include rights of subrogation or reimbursement in its list of information required
for all summary plan descriptions. Id. at 1209 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b)(1994)).
The court also rejected the participant's contention that such provisions fall
under the statutory requirement of "a description . . . of circumstances which
may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits." Id. at
1209; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994).
35. See, e.g., Layne, 1994 WL 719673, at *4 n.16 (concluding that a
participant's and beneficiary's "concession that the language in both the Official
Plan and the SPD authorized the Administrator to require participants to agree
to subrogate to the Plan monies received from third party tortfeasors (and such
tortfeasors' insurers) ... [was] fatal to their cause of action").
36. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 252 (1993) (quoting
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
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provisions. 8 The plan also provides information concerning the
plan administrator's role in interpreting plan terms, a critical
determinant of standard of review.3 9 ERISA allows only four entities to sue for specified relief under section 502: participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor.4 0 Entities
disputing the validity of plan subrogation and reimbursement provisions must satisfy the statutory definitions of terms in section
502. Under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), only participants and
beneficiaries are entitled "to recover benefits due . . . under the
terms of [the] plan, to enforce . . . rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify... rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan."4 ' Moreover, ERISA section 502(a)(3) permits participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries to "enjoin any act... which
violates.., the terms of the plan" or to "obtain other appropriate

38. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
39. For a recent discussion of the Fourth Circuit's "framework for review of
the denial of benefits under ERISA plans," see Ellis v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 126 F.3d 228, 232-34 (4th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs' appeals from
summary judgment are reviewed de novo, and benefit denials by plan
administrators vested with discretion to construe plan terms are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Id. at 232. See also id. at 233 (detailing the lessened
deference standard employed by courts "to neutralize any untoward influence
resulting from the [fiduciary's] conflict [of interest]"); Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (setting forth
eight factors that a court may consider when reviewing a plan administrator's
decision to deny benefits under a welfare benefit plan). When subrogation and
reimbursement provisions are at issue, plans sometimes deny benefits until
participants sign agreements reinforcing such provisions; the denials therefore
trigger this standard of review analysis. See, e.g., Trident Reg'l Health Sys. v.
Polin, 948 F. Supp. 509, 516-19 (D.S.C. 1996).
40. Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 102 F.3d 712,
714 (4th Cir. 1996) (observing that "[s]ection 502(a) provides the exclusive
statement of civil actions available under ERISA to the Secretary of Labor,
participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries")[hereinafter "Coyne II"].
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)(1994). This statutory provision is "explicitly
directed at wrongs suffered by individual [participants or] beneficiaries, referring
to 'benefits due to him' and 'his rights under the terms of the plan.'" Coyne 11, 102
F.3d at 715. Note that the provision does not give plan administrators a federal
cause of action for recovery of plan benefits. Waller, 906 F.2d at 987-88. If a
person is not a participant or beneficiary as defined by ERISA, then that person
does not have standing to sue a plan administrator or fiduciary for recovery of
benefits. HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hosp. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 101
F.3d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996) (ruling that hospital lacked standing).
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equitable relief to redress such violations or to enforce . . . the
terms of the plan."4 2
Disputes concerning the interpretation of plan subrogation
and reimbursement provisions prompt entities to sue for enforcement of rights under plan terms or conflicting state law. Entities
seek recovery of benefits, 4 3 declaratory relief,44 injunctive relief,4
and even class certification.4 6 Regardless of claimant or relief

sought, these disputes always entail scrutiny of plan terms.
V. THE

COLLISION OF

ERISA

AND STATE LAW

When participants and beneficiaries allege that plan terms

violate state law, courts inevitably address ERISA preemption. In
resolving the pursuit of settlement proceeds, courts encountering
allegations of state law applicability must review ERISA preemption with appropriate consideration of specific plan terms and
broader ERISA principles. With minor exceptions, ERISA preemption continues to leave intact plans' enforcement of subrogation and reimbursement rights under federal law.
A.

Post-Travelers ERISA Preemption

Because the pursuit of settlement proceeds necessitates evaluation of written plan terms that implicate relations among
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(1994). See also WV-OVA Welfare Fund, 29 F. Supp.
2d at 735 (recognizing that "[m]any courts hold actions brought by a plan to
enforce subrogation rights based on benefits paid by it are actions within the
scope of section 1132(a)(3)").
43. See McInnis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 586 (4th Cir.
1994) (preempting North Carolina's wrongful death statute for conflicting with
plan's reimbursement condition; beneficiary had sought full payment of medical
benefits to deceased participant's estate and limitation on reimbursement
pursuant to state law).
44. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (providing declaratory
relief for employer with self-funded plan; Court preempted Pennsylvania antisubrogation statute pursuant to ERISA's deemer clause); Paris,44 F. Supp. 2d at
747 (ruling on case initially filed as petition for declaratory judgment in state
court).
45. Great-West, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 585-86 (listing relief sought by plaintiff
plan, including an "injunction that prevents [beneficiary] from violating the
terms of the benefit plan").
46. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. v. DeGarmo, No. 5:93CV7,
1996 WL 780508, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 28, 1996) (granting class certification to
injured plan enrollees alleging unlawful subrogation and reimbursement
practices by health plan under ERISA, RICO, and the FDCPA).
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ERISA entities, the apparent post-Travelers"v atrophy of ERISA's
preemptive muscle has not hampered a plan's ability to enforce its
provisions under federal law.
The Fourth Circuit recently enunciated its preemption analysis in LeBlanc v. Cahill:48
Our analysis of this issue begins with the normal presumption
that Congress does not intend to preempt state law. We next...
apply a pragmatic approach of looking to the objectives of ERISA
to determine whether the normal presumption against preemption has been overcome... ERISA's main objective is to protect...
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries .

.

. [Clongress intended to ensure that plans and

plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law;
the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden
of complying with conflicting directives among States or between
States. and the Federal Government... [and to prevent] the potential for conflict in substantive law

. . .

requiring the tailoring of

plans and employer conduct to the peculiaritiesof the law of each
jurisdiction .

.

. Congress intended ERISA to preempt at least

three categories of state laws that can be said to have a connection
with an ERISA plan. First, Congress intended ERISA to preempt
state laws that mandate employee benefit structures or their
administration ....

Second, Congress intended to preempt state

laws that bind employers or plan administrators to particular
choices or preclude uniform administrativepractice, thereby functioning as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself... Third, . . .
Congress intended to preempt state laws providing alternative
enforcement mechanisms for employees to obtainERISA plan benefits. Finally, . ..

Congress did not intend to preempt traditional

state-based laws of general applicability that do not implicate the
relations among the traditionalERISA plan entities, including the
principals, the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the
beneficiaries.49

47. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995)(criticizing ERISA's "unhelpful text
... and look[ing] instead to the [statute's] objectives... as a guide to the scope of
the state law that Congress understood would survive"). Rejecting preemption of
a New York statute imposing surcharges on hospital patients with coverage
bought by ERISA plans, Justice Souter's opinion for a unanimous Court
suggested a retreat from preemption analysis based on "infinite relations."
48. 153 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1998).
49. Id. at 147 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The italicized portions of the court's analysis suggest that
ERISA convincingly preempts state laws invoked to pursue outcomes contrary to plan provisions or achievable pursuant to federal law. The policies of uniformity, protection of all participants
and beneficiaries, and adherence to written plan terms coalesce to
strengthen ERISA's preemption of such state laws.
B.

The Preeminence of Plan Provisions

Before turning to ERISA preemption of state laws alleged to
govern the pursuit of settlement proceeds, the time-honored deference to written plan terms warrants discussion. 50 Section
502(a)(1) of ERISA mandates that "[elvery employee benefit plan
... be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." 1 In addition, ERISA requires establishment of "a procedure for amending such plan" and specification of the "basis on
which payments are made to and from the plan." 52 ERISA also
requires fiduciaries to "discharge [their] duties with respect to a
plan... in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with the provisions of [titles I and IV]. "5 3 In United
McGill, the Fourth Circuit echoed ERISA's respect for written
plans:
Although ERISA establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme
for employee welfare benefit plans, it does not mandate any minimum substantive content for such plans. Rather, one of the primary functions of ERISA is to ensure the integrity of written,
bargained-for benefit plans. To satisfy this objective, the plain
language of an ERISA plan must be enforced in accordance with
54
its literal and natural meaning.
In Mertens the United States Supreme Court cautioned that
federal courts' authority to develop ERISA common law "is not the
authority to revise the text of the statute."5 5 The District of South
50. See, e.g., Cagle, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 554 ("[Olne of the primary functions of
ERISA is to ensure the integrity of written, bargained-for benefit plans.").
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)-(4).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Congress designated Titles I
and IV of ERISA "Protection of Employee Benefit Rights" and "Plan Termination
Insurance," respectively.
54. 154 F.3d at 172 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
55. 508 U.S. at 259 (quoted in Trident, 948 F. Supp. at 514).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss2/2
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Carolina extended this caveat by stating that "federal courts do
not rewrite the unambiguous terms of an ERISA plan."56
These inveterate principles, when heeded by plan drafters,
should minimize plan silence and ambiguity by translating into
thorough, well-written subrogation and reimbursement provisions. It is also possible (and prudent) to include simplified versions of these elaborate plan provisions in summary plan
descriptions, which must be "written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the average plan participant, and . . . sufficiently
accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise . . . participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the
plan."57 Eppard v. Builders Transport,Inc. ,518 an unreported decision, illustrates the consequences of plan silence concerning subrogation rights. Eppard was a participant in her employer's selffunded employee benefit plan that paid roughly $29,000 in medical bills that arose from an accident caused by a third party. 59
The participant and tortfeasor entered into a structured settlement that failed to address subrogation rights asserted by the
employer.6 0 The plan neither included a subrogation provision
nor required the participant to sign a subrogation agreement prior
to remittance of benefits. 6 ' The court rejected the employer's
assertion of a right to subrogation because the plan was silent on
the matter.6 2 The court also refused to fashion a federal common
law remedy of unjust enrichment; Waller 6 3 was distinguished
because that plan "provided for repayment of the advanced monies." 6a The court emphasized that the "plan contained no provision providing a right of subrogation" and concluded that it "need
proceed no further."65 Having left the parties' settlement agreement intact, the court justified its ruling:
56. Trident, 948 F. Supp. at 514.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994). See also supra note 34 and accompanying
text (pointing out that ERISA does not require the summary plan description to
include subrogation and reimbursement provisions, but such inclusion would be
helpful to participants and beneficiaries).
58. No. CIV.A.92-0002-C, 1993 WL 28813, at *1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4, 1993).
59. Id. at *1.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 906 F.2d 985.
64. Eppard, 1993 WL 28813, at *4.
65. Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2000

13

330

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 22:317

ERISA demands adherence to the written terms of [a] ... plan.
[The court] has no discretion under ERISA to add clauses the parties have neglected to include... [The Fourth Circuit has specifically cautioned the federal courts . . . to avoid nullifying the
statute by smuggling in state common law principles without
regard for the statutory text. Should the court grant an implied
right here, many would follow seeking to add terms ... they find
convenient. Such editing by the courts would thwart ERISA's...
goals of uniform and efficient plan administration. This court
must decline to open such a floodgate.6 6
Eppard exemplifies judicial reluctance to modify or supplement terms of written employee welfare benefit plans. Written
plan provisions should always prevail. If such provisions fail to
(or inadequately) address subrogation and reimbursement, the
plan should sustain the loss. On the other hand, unambiguous,
forearmed plan terms should prevail over defiant participants and
their attorneys. Courts' deference to written plan provisions not
only complies with ERISA's letter and spirit, but also allows parties to realize expectations generated by their contract as revealed
in the plan.
C.

Participants'Refusals to Cooperate With Plans

When plans expressly require participants' cooperation concerning subrogation and reimbursement rights, the pursuit of settlement proceeds often engenders intransigence by plans and
defiance by participants. Cooperation with plans includes giving
plans notice of suits against or settlement negotiations with third
party tortfeasors, 67 signing agreements that reinforce express
subrogation and reimbursement rights of the plan6 s or that condition receipt of benefits on recognizing such rights, 69 and promising
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Cooke, 1998 WL 181260, at *1 (citing plan provision requiring
"notiffication] before filing any suit or settling any claim so [the plan] may take
part in the suit or settlement to protect and enforce [the plan's] rights").
68. See, e.g., Sturgill, 1997 WL 722776, at *2 (citing plan provision that
granted plan administrator "the right to recover in full the medical or disability
expenses advanced regardless of whether [the covered person] actually signs the
repayment agreement").
69. See, e.g., Dillard v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Va. Health &
Welfare Fund, No. CIV.A. 84-0164-L, 1985 WL 17724, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31,
1985) (citing plan provision that "required participants and beneficiaries to
execute written subrogation agreements as a condition of payment on claims
arising from injuries caused by third parties").
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss2/2
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not to release any third party tortfeasor from liability.70 The
intensity of participants' refusals to cooperate with plans often
depends on the clarity of plan terms. Problematic plans, for example, include those that assert general rights of subrogation and
reimbursement but fail to specify sources such as a participant's
underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage. 7 ' On the other
hand, some plans invite legal challenges by asserting broad subrogation and reimbursement rights that conflict with plan terms
that are too precise. For example, to justify its application of the
plain meaning rule, the Rhodes court cited cases in which "plan
recovery was limited only to funds designated as 'medical benefits'" because "the language of the plan document itself provided
the limitation."7 2 Such a narrow plan term, if exclusive, bolsters
the participant's argument against reimbursement from settlement proceeds earmarked as compensation for injuries such as
pain and suffering. 73 Again, plans can avoid these disputes by
drafting with care. Indeed, courts frown upon participants and
attorneys whose failure to cooperate with plans opposes clear plan
terms.7 4
D.

Preempted Statutory Law

For the most part, courts in the Fourth Circuit have ruled
that ERISA preempts state statutes that interfere with the terms
70. See, e.g., Harmond v. Teamsters Joint Council of the Va. Health &
Welfare Fund, No. 92-2043, 1993 WL 306100, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 1993)
(citing plan provision requiring participant or beneficiary to "covenant that he [or
she] has not discharged or released any such right... against any third party").
71. Id. at *2 (citing subrogation agreement that failed to mention
participant's uninsured motorist coverage but entitled plan to participant's
"rights.. . against 'any person. . . or other entity").
72. Rhodes, 937 F. Supp. at 1213 (citing Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 1995)).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Cooke, 1998 WL 181260, at *2 (warning that recovery of attorney
fees by plan administrator should discourage "other members of the self-funded
plan from attempting to secretly pocket funds owed as reimbursement to the
plan"); Sturgill, 1997 WL 722776, at *2 (stating that the participants' "continued
litigation of a frivolous and meritless claim more than justifies the awarding of
reasonable attorneys' fees to [the employer]"); Devine, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 678
(placing considerable weight on bad faith factor because participant's attorney
"omitted critical language from a Plan provision at the heart of [the] dispute" and
consequently "misled the Court"), vacated, Devine v. Am. Benefit Corp., 56 F.
Supp. 2d 679, 683 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (reconsidering participant's liability for
attorney fees sua sponte because of attorney's "skeletal representation on
[participant's] ability to pay" such fees).
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of employee benefit plans. Even so, participants invoking Virginia
and North Carolina statutory law to prevent subrogation and
reimbursement have obtained mixed results that depend on the
plan and the allegedly applicable state statute.
Virginia's anti-subrogation statute has been an element of
participants' argument against subrogation and reimbursement
in the employee benefit plan context. The Western District of Virginia addressed these issues in 1985 and held that ERISA preempted Virginia's anti-subrogation statute. 7 5 The injured plan
participant had attempted to use state law to invalidate her selffunded plan's subrogation provisions, but the court ruled that her
"contention . . . overlook[ed] the preemption provisions of
ERISA." 76 The court appropriately examined ERISA's legislative
history and repeated Congress' intent "to eliminate the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent state or local regulation and establish
in its stead a predictable, uniform source of federal law to govern
employee benefit plans."7 7
The reasoning in Dillard did not apply to the dispute in
Health Cost Controls v. Whalen because the plan in the latter case
was an insured group plan and was therefore subject to state
insurance laws. 78 The Whalen court rendered the plan's subrogation and reimbursement provisions unenforceable based on Virginia law, 9 yet it failed to analyze the state statute as falling
under ERISA's savings clause."' The propriety of such analysis is
questionable given ERISA's broad governance of employee welfare
benefit plans.
The Fourth Circuit has ruled that ERISA preempts a North
Carolina apportionment statute that limits medical providers'
liens on personal injury awards to no more than "fifty percent of
the amount of damages recovered." 8
The statute expressly
excludes attorney fees from this calculation. 2 In Hampton Industries the beneficiary of a self-funded plan refused to honor the
plan's subrogation and reimbursement provisions after recovering
75. Dillard, 1985 WL 17724, at *1.
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id. at *4.
78. Health Cost Controls v. Whalen, No. CIV.A.1:96-66A, 1996 WL 787163, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 1996).
79. Id. at *2.
80. For a concise discussion of ERISA's savings clause, see Tri-State Machine,
Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1994).
81. 981 F.2d at 728.
82. Id. at 728.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol22/iss2/2
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from a tortfeasor. 3 The district court held that the beneficiary
was "bound to the terms of... the subrogation clause," but that
the apportionment statute governed apportionment of settlement
funds. 8 a Following the Supreme Court's decision in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, the Fourth Circuit ruled that ERISA preempted the
statute. It then remanded "to determine the allocation of settlement proceeds."8 5
The finding of ERISA preemption in Hampton Industries was
straightforward, but the remand for allocation of,proceeds raises
an interesting point. The court limited relief on remand to the
employer's request for "the balance of the settlement fund ...less
the attorneys' fees due [to the beneficiary's law firm]" because the
beneficiary failed to mention the issue in her brief.8 6 Of course,
this footnote may be a simple judicial signal to the beneficiary's
lawyer to cover all issues on brief, but, more significantly, it raises
the question whether the plan's position concerning such fees was
based on an express plan provision. Assuming no subtraction of
fees from the reimbursement amount and plan silence concerning
such fees, how would a court divide the settlement proceeds?
ERISA plans have also encountered challenges based on
North Carolina's wrongful death statute.8 7 In Liberty, a group
health plan participant died several days after sustaining injuries
in a motor vehicle accident.88 Liberty, the deceased participant's
employer and the plan's administrator, paid "$93,829.50 in medical bills on [the participant's behalf]. ""9 The plan's subrogation
provision stated that "[tihe insured individual will reimburse the
Plan the amount of benefits paid."9 0 Liberty and the participant's
personal representative had agreed that the estate would fully
reimburse the plan in the event of a third party recovery; however,
a subsequent, court-approved settlement with the tortfeasors
specified distribution of proceeds in accordance with North Carolina's wrongful death statute. 9 1 According to the court, ERISA did
not preempt the statute's $1,500 limit on the amount paid from a
wrongful death recovery for "reasonable hospital and medical
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 727-28.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 728-30.
Id. at 730 n.9.
Mclnnis, 21 F.3d at 586; Liberty, 984 F.2d at 1383.
Liberty, 984 F.2d at 1385.
Id.
Id. at 1385 n.1.
Id. at 1385.
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expenses."9 2 Because the decedent's beneficiaries, not the decedent himself, had the right to sue the tortfeasors for wrongful
death, and given that the plan expressly subrogated only the decedent's rights, the court held that "the cap on medical expenses
3
[did] not 'relate to' the Plan within the meaning of ERISA."9
With minimal discussion of plan terms and ERISA's policy,
the majority in Liberty prohibited the plan from recovering any
amount exceeding $1,500 of the $1,500,000 settlement. 94 Judge
Hall's dissent, which concluded that ERISA preempted North Carolina's wrongful death provision, called for reimbursement to the
plan of any settlement proceeds designated to compensate for the
deceased participant's medical expenses.9 5 Furthermore, after
declaring that "North Carolina may not ... deprive an ERISA
plan of its subrogation rights", the dissent keenly observed that
the majority opinion would force the plan, which covered "employees in 24 states", to comply with "directly conflicting .
approaches to the subrogation of medical costs paid on behalf of
deceased tort victims."96
McInnis also entailed analysis of ERISA's relationship to
North Carolina's wrongful death statute. 97 In Mclnnis, the widower of a plan participant, as successor in interest, sought payment of his deceased spouse's medical expenses from her employee
benefit plan but refused to sign a reimbursement agreement
required by the plan.9 Distinguishing Liberty, the Fourth Circuit
stated that "the answer to the question of whether a claim under
North Carolina's wrongful death statute belongs to the deceased
plan participant or to a beneficiary of the decedent defines the line
between remoteness and relatedness under [Liberty]." 99 Because
the judicially approved settlement order "included [damages]
belonging to [the deceased participant] and her estate," the court
held that ERISA preempted the statute "to the extent that [it] preclude[d] operation of the terms of the.., clause in the plan." 10 0
The McInnis court considered the parties' agreement and the
"expectations of all other plan participants who have an interest
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1388-89, 1387 n.2.
Id. at 1388-89.
Liberty, 984 F.2d at 1387.
Id. at 1390-91.
Id. at 1391-92.
Mclnnis, 21 F.3d at 586.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 590.
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in the plan's funds and benefits," 10 1 but failed to address how the
expectations of the Liberty plan and its participants were distinct.
Moreover, both decisions seemed to accord undue weight to terms
of court-approved settlements at the expense of plan terms and a
thorough review of ERISA's policies. Although the McInnis court
concluded that "a] state statute that would alter these benefits
would impermissibly interfere in an area preempted by
ERISA," 10 2 it nevertheless failed to elaborate sufficiently as to
how the facts in Liberty justified the wrongful death statute's
alteration of benefits, revision of expectations, and interference
with the ERISA plan in that case.
E.

Preempted Common Law

In addition to state statutory law, participants invoke common law doctrines to determine the allocation of settlement proceeds. In one case involving injured minors who were also
beneficiaries under their parent's employee welfare benefit plan,
the district court ruled that ERISA preempted North Carolina's
doctrine of necessaries. °3 Respecting plan provisions that defined
the rights and obligations of 'covered persons,' the court concluded
that the children's acceptance of plan benefits "obligated [them] to
reimburse the plan from any third party recovery. " 10 4 The court
stated:
the North Carolina necessaries doctrine would prevent seamless
administration of nationwide or multi-state plans. Plan administrators would have to calculate the diminished recovery that could
be obtained in the event a child was injured and received payments under the ERISA plan in a state with a provision similar to
the necessaries doctrine. Plans would have to be restructured and
benefits for minors or dependents could be correspondingly diminished as a result. This is precisely the type of situation the ERISA
preemption provision... was designed to address. They ... should

not be allowed to deplete Plan assets to the detriment of other...
employees through creative legal argument.', 5
The court's concern with depletion of plan assets is consistent
with Congress' interest in the "continued well-being and security
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Rhodes, 937 F. Supp. at 1211.
Id.
Id. at 1212.
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of millions of employees and their dependents [who] are directly
affected by [employee benefit] plans." 1°6
Fourth Circuit court decisions finding preemption of the common law make-whole doctrine also use language that appears deferential to ERISA policies. In such cases, injured participants
alleging inadequacy of compensation invoke the make-whole doctrine to invalidate plan subrogation and reimbursement provisions. In Trident, an injured participant violated plan terms by
failing to notify the plan of her suit against the tortfeasor, neglecting to obtain the plan's consent to settlement, and refusing to sign
a subrogation agreement. 10 7 The court rejected application of "a
'make whole' rule... requiring that a plan participant's expenses
be fully satisfied prior to the participant reimbursing the plan."' 0 s
After citing several decisions that recognized control of the issue
by plan terms, the court concluded that:
[tihe plain language of the Plan dictates that [the participant]
reimburse it for all of its expenses, and there is no requirement
that [the plan] postpone enforcing its subrogation rights until [the
participant's] expenses have been fully satisfied. Indeed, mandating such a requirement via creation of a federal common law rule
contravenes ERISA. 0 9
The Northern District of West Virginia also looked to plan
language in Great-West." 0 The plan in that case contained a
strongly worded provision granting "first lien rights" to the plan in
the event of any third party recovery."' The court held that "the
plain language of the Plan preclude[d] the need to fashion federal
common law," but it did not discuss "whether the make-whole doctrine should apply to self-funded ERISA plans as a matter of federal common law. " 1 2 At a minimum, though, the court's
application of ERISA preemption and examination of plan terms
106. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1994). A recent article points out that insured ERISA
plans cover approximately seventy-seven million Americans while self-funded
ERISA plans cover another forty-six million. See Sarah A. Klein, Supreme Court
Considers ERISA Preemption, AM. MED. NEws, Mar. 22, 1999.
107. Trident, 948 F. Supp. at 511-12.
108. Id. at 513.
109. Id. at 516. The District of Maryland reached a similar result in Paris. See
Paris, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 747. Recognizing the "clear and unequivocal plan
language", the court soundly rejected application of the "make whole doctrine" as
ERISA common law. Id. at 748-49.
110. Great-West, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 584.
111. Id. at 587.
112. Id. at 586.
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indicate that development of common law is a judicial last resort,
which is consistent with principles enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Singer v. Black & Decker. 113 Even so, clear plan language
is the optimal protection against adoption of the make-whole doctrine as part of the federal common law of ERISA. 114
VI.

ATTORNEY FEES: DEDUCT, DISREGARD, OR DEMAND?

Absent application of ERISA section 502(g)"' and the Quesinberry factors" 6 to determine attorney fee awards, plaintiffs' attor113. Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[Resort to
federal common law generally is inappropriate when its application is would
conflict with the statutory provisions of ERISA, discourage employers from
implementing plans governed by ERISA, or threaten to override the explicit
terms of an established ERISA benefit plan.") (citing Waller, 906 F.2d at 992).
114. Notwithstanding Trident, Waller, and United McGill, decisions in which
courts in the Fourth Circuit addressed federal common law issues with favorable
results to plans, the adoption of a default rule by other courts suggests that such
issues will not disappear-after all, "federal common law should be consistent
across the circuits." Singer, 964 F.2d at 1453. In Marshall v. Employers Health
Ins. Co., Nos. 96-6063, 96-6112, 1997 WL 809997, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1997),
the Sixth Circuit adopted the make-whole rule as a default rule:
Such a rule is consistent with the equitable principle that insurer does
not have a right of subrogation until the insured has been fully
compensated, unless the agreement itself provides to the contrary .... If
a plan sets out the extent of the subrogation right or states that the
participant's right to be made whole is superseded by the plan's
subrogation right[, then] no silence or ambiguity exists. Id. at *4.
See also Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir. 1997)(applying make
whole doctrine as a default rule to "limit a plan's subrogation rights where an
insured has not received compensation for his total loss and the plan does not
explicitly preclude operationof the doctrine" (emphasis added)); Copeland Oaks v.
Haupt, 41 F. Supp.2d. 747 (N.D. Ohio 1999), reversed on other grounds, No. 993471, 2000 WL 354135 (6th Cir. Apr. 7, 2000) (applying make-whole rule because
plan language did not "explicitly override the make-whole rule" or "claim priority
over funds when the recovery is only partial or incomplete"). But cf. Paris, 44 F.
Supp. 2d at 749 ("To the extent that the [beneficiarys] opposition memorandum
can be read to suggest that the plan documents must mention the 'make-whole
doctrine' in haec verba, the Court rejects such contention as unsupported by
authority and unsound."). Accordingly, despite favorable decisions by courts in
the Fourth Circuit, application of the make whole doctrine as a default rule in
other circuits should be viewed as a red flag alerting plans to reassess the
language of subrogation and reimbursement provisions.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)(1994) ("In any action . . . by a participant,

beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.").
116. See Sturgill, 1997 WL 722776 at *2 n.2. The court listed the five
considerations in determining an award of attorney fees under ERISA:
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neys are left to the mercy of contingency fee agreements, plan
reimbursement provisions, or judicial intervention. Although
attorneys who hold settlement proceeds in escrow are not fiduciaries,' 1 7 their conduct before, during, and after settlement negotiations significantly affects the final disposition of settlement
proceeds. Attorneys should review terms of their clients' plans
carefully before asserting a legal position in obvious contravention
of contractual duties and judicial precedent. Because courts value
their time, there is little tolerance for hearing
unnecessary dis8
putes over unambiguous plan provisions."1
Plans also should be reviewed for any mention of attorney
fees. Attorney fees can be deducted or disregarded pursuant to
plan terms, or parties can demand them in the courtroom. Accordingly, plan subrogation and reimbursement provisions should
expressly contemplate whether attorney fees are fully deducted,
proportionately shared, or entirely discounted in the pursuit of
proceeds. Clear contractual provisions are preferable to unpredictable, judge-made rules of federal common law." 9
(1) [the] degree of opposing parties' culpability or bad faith;
(2) [the] ability of opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees;
(3) whether an award of attorneys' fees against the opposing party
would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances;
(4) whether the parties requesting attorneys' fees sought to benefit all
participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a
significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and
(5) the relative merits of the parties' positions.
117. Rhodes, 937 F. Supp. at 1214-15 ("The Fourth Circuit recently refused to
impose fiduciary status on an attorney for a health plan [citation omitted], and
the Court is certainly wary to impose that status on the attorney for a plan
beneficiary.").
118. See, e.g., Sturgill, 1997 WL 722776, at *2 (upholding fees award against
attorney personally for "fail[ing] to put forth a coherent legal argument" and
causing a "waste ofjudicial resources"); Devine, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (refusing to
"ignore the apparent lack of any basis for suing [the administrator] in the first
place"); Cooke, 1998 WL 181260, at *2 (emphasizing "the lack of merit in
[participants'] contentions" and compelling payment of fees "to deter such
conduct by other insureds").
119. See, e.g., Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 141 (8th Cir. 1997)
(establishing federal common law rule that reduced plan's recovery by "the
amount of a reasonable attorney's fee" because the plan's "subrogation clause
contain[ed] no provision regarding attorney's fees"); Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim
Health Care, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 143, 152-53 (D. Mass. 1998) (allowing pro rata
reduction for reasonable attorney fees in absence of plan provision concerning
such fees), distinguished in Paris,44 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
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In United McGill, the Fourth Circuit declined to address the
hypothetical situation in which settlement proceeds are inadequate to reimburse a plan, satisfy attorney fees, and compensate
an injured participant. 2 o Plans should expressly contemplate the
inadequate recovery to prevent courts' development of federal
12 1
common law to rectify silent or ambiguous plan provisions.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Put simply (and alliteratively), plans prevail in the pursuit of
proceeds by paying attention to their provisions. Plans must protect their participants and beneficiaries from the "asset-draining
evils" 122 that elevate costs for everyone.123 Arguably, the degree
of specificity in plans is inversely proportional to the extent courts
develop federal common law to resolve disputes concerning subrogation and reimbursement provisions. 'Get back to basics,' though
a trite imperative, is particularly applicable to such disputes: bedrock ERISA principles of uniformity, protection, and formality
outweigh disparate notions of equity and isolated extracontractual
modifications. 'Filling the interstices' 124 is not difficult. Wellwritten plans should require ongoing cooperation of participants
and their attorneys with plan administrators, specify reasonably
possible sources of recovery other than tortfeasors, address the
impact of attorney fees on reimbursement amounts, and provide a
fair, workable formula for allocation of inadequate proceeds. Certainty is ERISA's cornerstone; 12 the clearest plans will inevitably
change the dissonance to resonance in the pursuit of proceeds.

120. 154 F.3d at 173.
121. For examples of plan provisions addressing attorney fees, see supra note
29.
122. Devine, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
123. See supra notes 5 and 32.
124. Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1997) (declaring that
courts "may adopt a common law principle only if 'necessary to fill in
interstitially or otherwise effectuate [ERISA's] statutory pattern enacted... by
Congress'"(citations omitted)). If plan drafters do not fill the gaps, then, after
considerable expense to all parties, courts ultimately will do so.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1994) ("The Congress finds... that... it is desirable
in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries ...

that disclosure be made

and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and
administration of [employee benefit] plans").
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